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Extending the Guiding Lefthand of Counsel: The Minnesota Supreme
Court Provides Protection against Uncounseled Waivers of the Right to
Counsel During Interrogations
Abstract
It is the thesis of this Article that the cases on which the Minnesota Supreme Court in Lefthand relied and the
policy concerns that motivated the court suggest that the rule of Lefthand should apply to any suspect who has
asserted her right to counsel, regardless of whether that suspect is in custody, formally charged, or formally
represented by counsel. If the court's ruling in Lefthand is carried to its logical scope, law enforcement officers
and prosecutors in Minnesota may find that very early in the criminal justice process they are precluded from
obtaining waivers of the right to counsel from suspects in order to obtain a statement, unless the suspect's
attorney is present or has been notified prior to any interrogation.
This Article first briefly reviews the current law regarding right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. It demonstrates that in the factual setting of the Lefthand case
and similar cases, these federal rights are not violated when the police obtain a waiver of the right to counsel
from the suspect without counsel being present or having been notified, and subsequent statements are
admissible under federal law.
This Article then examines the right to counsel provided suspects under Minnesota state law. In particular, the
Article focuses on the Lefthand case and the cases to which the Lefthand court referred as giving "notice of our
'strong[] disapprov[al]' of the practice engaged in by the government. The Article argues that these cases,
especially when read in the context of the Minnesota Supreme Court's history of "jealously guard[ing]" the
right to counsel, require the court to apply the right recognized in Lefthand to all suspects who have asserted
their right to counsel, regardless of whether they are within the narrow fact situation at issue in Lefthand.s As
demonstrated below, such a rule is necessary to protect adequately the right to counsel so highly valued by the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
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EXTENDING THE GUIDING LEFTHAND OF COUNSEL:
THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT PROVIDES
PROTECTION AGAINST UNCOUNSELED WAIVERS OF
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING INTERROGATIONS
Edwin J. Butterfoss* and Lisa J. Burkett**
I. INTRODUCTION
Attempting to obtain a statement from a suspect can be a
precarious endeavor for law enforcement agents. In particular, an
agent must be aware of and respect the two rights to counsel enjoyed
by the suspect under the United States Constitution: the Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
These rights overlap significantly, but are by no means concurrent.
For each right, the officer faces different rules as to when the right
attaches, the need to inform the suspect of the right, the government
conduct prohibited once the right has attached, the effect of an
assertion of the right by the defendant, and the requirements for a
valid waiver of the right. The risks posed by the complex and
confusing rules under the federal constitution can be exacerbated by
additional protections state courts impose under state constitutions
and state ethical rules.
In State v. Lefthand,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court, relying on
the suspect's right to counsel under the state and federal constitution,
as well as state rules of professional conduct, exercised its supervisory
power to rule that statements obtained during in-custody interroga-
tions of formally accused suspects represented by counsel are subject
to exclusion at trial, despite a waiver by the suspect, unless counsel
is present at the interrogation or has been notified of the interroga-
tion.2 Because the suspect in Lefthand not only waived his right to
counsel, but also initiated the interrogation by the police, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's ruling is a significant expansion of the rights
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law; B.S., 1977, Miami University
(Ohio); J.D., 1980, Georgetown University Law Center.
** B.A., 1989, University of Minnesota; J.D., 1992, Hamline University School of
Law.
1. 488 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 1992).
2. Id. at 801-02.
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enjoyed by the defendant under the federal constitution.3 Moreover,
the court's reliance on the state rules of professional conduct and
on cases in which statements were obtained from suspects who either
had not been formally charged or were not in custody suggests that
the court's rule extends beyond the narrow holding of the Lefthand
case.
It is the thesis of this Article that the cases on which the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Lefthand relied and the policy concerns
that motivated the court suggest that the rule of Lefthand should
apply to any suspect who has asserted her right to counsel, regardless
of whether that suspect is in custody, formally charged, or formally
represented by counsel. If the court's ruling in Lefthand is carried
to its logical scope, law enforcement officers and prosecutors in
Minnesota may find that very early in the criminal justice process
they are precluded from obtaining waivers of the right to counsel
from suspects in order to obtain a statement, unless the suspect's
attorney is present or has been notified prior to any interrogation.
This Article first briefly reviews the current law regarding right
to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.4 It demonstrates that in the factual setting of
the Lefthand case and similar cases, these federal rights are not
violated when the police obtain a waiver of the right to counsel from
the suspect without counsel being present or having been notified,
and subsequent statements are admissible under federal law.
This Article then examines the right to counsel provided suspects
under Minnesota state law. In particular, the Article focuses on the
Lefthand case and the cases to which the Lefthand court referred as
giving "notice of our 'strong[] disapprov[al]' of the practice engaged
in by the government. 6 The Article argues that these cases, especially
when read in the context of the Minnesota Supreme Court's history
of "jealously guard[ing]" the right to counsel, 7 require the court to
apply the right recognized in Lefthand to all suspects who have
asserted their right to counsel, regardless of whether they are within
3. The court justified providing protections beyond the requirements of federal law,
stating, "[even the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged states are free to adopt
'different requirements for the conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state
law."' Id. at 802 n.7 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986)).
4. See infra notes 12-40 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
6. 488 N.W.2d at 801 (quoting State v. Renfrew, 159 N.W.2d Ill, 113 (Minn. 1968)).
7. Id. at 801 & n.5.
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the narrow fact situation at issue in Lefthand.s As demonstrated
below, such a rule is necessary to protect adequately the right to
counsel so highly valued by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 9
The rule of Lefthand was imposed by the court, at least in part,
to effectuate the policies underlying Minnesota Rule of Professional
Conduct 4.2, which prohibits communications between a lawyer and
"a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer."' 0
Unlike the right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
the protections of Rule 4.2 are not limited to situations in which a
person is formally accused or is in custody. Instead, the rule is
triggered when a party is simply represented by an attorney. Similarly,
because the government controls when a suspect is "in custody" or
is "formally charged," a rule that triggers the protection of Lefthand
at the point a suspect is represented by counsel is necessary in order
to prevent the Lefthand rule from being circumvented at will by the
government." Further, the Lefthand rule should not depend on the
suspect being formally represented by counsel, a fact that may depend
on the fortuity of successfully contacting and retaining an attorney
with one phone call. Instead, the protections of Lefthand should be
triggered whenever a suspect from whom the government seeks an
incriminating statement indicates a desire for the assistance of counsel
in making the decision whether to cooperate. Although such a rule
potentially advances the "attachment" of the right to counsel to a
point earlier than the facts of Lefthand, such a rule is necessary to
provide consistent protection for suspects from whom the government
is seeking cooperation.
II. THE FEDERAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE FIFTH AND SIXTH
AMENDMENTS
The United States Supreme Court long has recognized the im-
portance of counsel in the interrogation context. In several early
decisions based on due process, the Court relied on the fact that
suspects were prevented from consulting with an attorney to overturn
8. See infra notes 70-133 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 134-47 and accompanying text.
10. MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 4.2 (1993); Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 801 n.6.
II. See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Jamail, 546 F.2d 646, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir.
1983); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.5 at 313 (2d ed. 1992). But see Marc A.
Schwartz, Prosecutorial Investigations and DR 7-104(A)(1), 89 COLUM. L. REV. 940, 954 n.97
(1989).
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convictions obtained with involuntary confessions. 1'2 In later confes-
sion cases, the Court recognized a right to counsel during interro-
gation grounded in the Sixth Amendment. 3 When the Court decided
Miranda v. Arizona14 and established a right to counsel based on the
Fifth Amendment, however, the due process and Sixth Amendment
cases moved to the background. 5 But recent cases have made clear
that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel are both
significant. As Professor Dressler states: "It is necessary to treat the
Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment versions of the right to
counsel separately. They attach at different times . . . , under dif-
ferent circumstances, and for somewhat different reasons.'
6
A. Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
Although the Fifth Amendment does not expressly provide a
right to counsel, in Miranda v. Arizona 7 the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogations was "indispensable to the protection of the
Fifth Amendment privilege" against compelled testimony.' 8 The Court
thus created what is known as the Fifth Amendment or Miranda
right to counsel. 19 Prior to custodial interrogation, the suspect must
be informed of the right to representation by counsel and the right
to have an attorney present during any questioning. The suspect may
waive the right, but if a suspect at any time invokes this right "the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." ' 20 Without an
attorney, the suspect may be questioned only if the suspect "initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the po-
lice.'"21
12. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 372 (1992).
13. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964).
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 12, at 378; JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURE 314 (1991).
16. DRESSLER, supra note 15, at 265.
17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. Id. at 469.
19. Id. at 470. See also, DRESSLER, supra note 15, at 265.
20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
21. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). The Miranda decision itself stated only
that once a suspect asserts her right to counsel the interrogation must cease until an attorney
is present. The opinion did not indicate whether or under what circumstances interrogation
could continue without an attorney's presence. In Edwards, the court clarified the procedure
[Vol. 17
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This rule applies to questioning about unrelated crimes22 and
remains in force even after the suspect has consulted with an attor-
ney. 23 However, once the suspect initiates communication with the
police, she is free again to waive the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel.2 The Miranda rule only applies to custodial interrogation.
Therefore, it does not prohibit interrogation of suspects not in
custody or communication with a suspect in custody that does not
amount to interrogation, even if it results in incriminating state-
ments. 25 The rule further does not apply to questioning by undercover
to be followed when a suspect asserts the right to counsel. In that case, police officers returned
to interrogate the suspect despite his statement a day earlier that he '"wantled] an attorney
before making a deal."' Id. at 479 (quoting the defendant). Although the defendant alleged
that his jailer told him "he had" to talk to the officers, it was undisputed that the officers
reread him his Miranda rights and he agreed to talk. The Supreme Court rejected the state
court's conclusion that defendant's subsequent statement was admissible because the statement
was voluntary. The Court established a per se rule to deal with situations where the defendant
asserts the right to counsel during interrogations, stating:
We further hold that an accused, . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
Id. at 484-85. A different rule, requiring that police "scrupulously honor" a defendant's
assertion of her rights, but not setting forth a bright line rule, applies if the defendant asserts
her right to remain silent, rather than her right to counsel, during custodial interrogation. See
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
22. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1981).
23. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). In Minnick, the defendant was being
held in California on a Mississippi warrant for suspicion of murder. During interrogation by
F.B.I. agents, defendant asserted his right to counsel. Over the next day or two, the defendant
consulted with appointed counsel two or three times. Subsequently, a deputy sheriff from
Mississippi arrived to question the defendant. Defendant was readvised of his rights and made
a statement. The United States Supreme Court suppressed the statement made to the deputy
sheriff on the authority of Edwards v. Arizona. See supra note 21. The Court stated that
"Edwards is 'designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously
asserted Miranda rights.' . . . The merit of the Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its
command and the certainty of its application." Minnick, 498 U.S. at 150, 151. Therefore, the
Court refused to have the protection of Edwards "terminate[] once counsel has consulted with
the suspect." Id. at 151. Instead, the Court held that absent initiation by the defendant, only
the actual presence of counsel at the interrogation would suffice to provide adequate assurances
that defendant's rights were being honored. Id. at 152-53.
24. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). In Bradshaw, a plurality of the Court
held that the defendant's statement "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" following
an assertion of his right to counsel "evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized
discussion about the investigation" sufficient to allow the police to seek a waiver and conduct
an interrogation following a lie detector test the following day. Id. at 1045-47.
25. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Innis, the suspect agreed to reveal
the location of the murder weapon following a conversation between officers in the front seat
of the patrol car in which he was sitting concerning the possibility of the weapon coming into
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officers, even if the suspect is in custody 2 6
B. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
As mentioned above, although the right to the presence of
counsel during interrogations under the Sixth Amendment was rec-
ognized very early by the Supreme Court, 27 the right faded to the
background after the Miranda decision. 28 A decade after Miranda
the court reaffirmed the independent significance of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel in Brewer v. Williams.29 In Brewer, the Supreme
Court held that statements made by a police officer while transporting
a suspect between two cities violated the Sixth Amendment because
it amounted to a deliberate attempt to elicit information from the
defendant after his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached.30
The case reinvigorated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the
interrogation context because the Court expressly chose not to decide
the case based on Miranda despite its apparent applicability. 3' Sub-
sequent cases made clear that although the Sixth Amendment right
may overlap the Fifth Amendment right, the rights are grounded on
different analytical bases and demand separate rules.3 2
the hands of some children from a nearby school for handicapped children. Id. at 294-95.
Although defendant had asserted his right to counsel prior to being placed in the squad car,
the Supreme Court ruled that his Miranda rights had not been violated because the discussion
by the police did not amount to interrogation. Id. at 302. The Court defined interrogation as
either express questioning or its "functional equivalent," defining that to mean "words or
actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response." Id. The Court ruled that the conversation by the police
officers did not amount to interrogation under the announced test. Id. at 303.
26. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990). In Perkins, the defendant made incriminating
statements while in prison to an undercover agent posing as a cellmate. Id. at 295. The Court
held that
[c]onversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns
underlying Miranda. The essential ingredients of a 'police-dominated atmosphere'
and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone
whom he believes to be a fellow inmate. Coercion is determined from the perspective
of the suspect .... Questioning by captors, who appear to control the suspect's
fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will
weaken the suspect's will, but where a suspect does not know that he is conversing
with a government agent, these pressures do not exist.
Id. at 296-97.
27. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
28. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 12, at 378.
29. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
30. Id. The right had attached because the defendant had been arraigned by a judge
before being transported.
31. Id. at 397. See Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is
'Interrogation'? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 3-4 & n.25, 24-33 (1978).
32. See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 299; Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n.4.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when the
criminal justice process has advanced from investigatory to accusa-
tory. It is triggered "by any event which indicates that the government
has committed itself to prosecute, 'whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."' 33
Prior to such an event, the right simply is inapplicable.3 4 This is true
even if the suspect has retained counsel. 5 When the right does attach,
it attaches only for the crime to which the triggering event (i.e.
formal charge, indictment, etc.) relates.
3 6
Once the right to counsel has attached for a particular crime,
the government is prevented from "deliberately eliciting" information
from the defendant unless a waiver is obtained or counsel is present.
Unlike the Fifth Amendment right, this prohibition applies even when
the defendant is not in custody and applies to undercover or otherwise
surreptitious activities that amount to "deliberate elicitation.
'3 7
The Sixth Amendment right can be waived in the absence of
counsel, and it is in the area of waiver that the rules governing the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel most closely resemble those gov-
erning the Fifth Amendment right. After the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel has attached, but before the defendant has actually re-
quested counsel, police may seek a waiver of the right from the
suspect in the absence of counsel. The waiver must be knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary, but the typical Miranda warnings and
waiver will suffice.3" Once counsel has been requested, a rule anal-
ogous to the rule of Edwards in the Fifth Amendment context applies.
The government may not deliberately seek to elicit information from
the suspect, or even seek a waiver of the right to counsel, unless the
defendant initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversa-
tions with the government.3 9 The same rule likely applies where the
defendant has hired or has been appointed a lawyer, even absent a
specific request for counsel by the defendant.40
33. WHITEBREAD, supra note 12, at 413 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)).
34. Maine v. Moulten, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
35. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); WHITEBREAD, supra note 12, at 414.
36. Moulten, 474 U.S. 159.
37. See Moulten, 474 U.S. 159; United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
38. Patterson v. Illinois, 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
39. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
40. DRESSLER, supra note 15, at 327; WHITEBREAD, supra note 12, at 417.
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III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER MINNESOTA STATE LAW: State
v. Lefthand
Prior to Lefthand, Minnesota law pertaining to the right to
counsel during interrogations generally paralleled federal law. Al-
though the Minnesota Supreme Court had extended the right to
counsel beyond the federal protections to provide suspects the right
to consult with an attorney prior to deciding whether to submit to
blood alcohol testing, 4' no similar expansion beyond the federal
protections had taken place in the area of obtaining statements from
suspects.42 The court on occasion expressed disapproval of interro-
gations of suspects who had already retained counsel, but had never
suppressed a statement that was the fruit of such interrogation on
grounds independent of the federal constitution.43 Thus, prior to
41. Freidman v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991). The court
held that because chemical testing is a critical stage in DWI proceedings, the right to counsel
attaches. The United States Supreme Court had rejected such a position, South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), and in fact, long ago rejected the "critical stage" test for
applicability of right to counsel in favor of the "trial-like confrontation" test. United States
v. Ash, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); see WHITEBREAD, supra note 12, at 846-47. Moreover, under
federal law, even if the suspect is subjected to a "trial-like confrontation," the Sixth Amend-
ment is not applicable unless the confrontation takes place after the initiation of adversary
proceedings, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); see WMTEBREAD, supra note 12, at 849.
42. Minnesota law also provides greater protection for the right of indigents to repre-
sentation at trial. See Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 801 & n.5.
43. The court had expressed its disapproval in at least four cases. In State v. Renfrew,
159 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. 1968), the defendant had consulted with counsel, but later initiated
communication with the police and waived his right to counsel. Although the court ruled that
the procedure was lawful under federal law (the Miranda decision was released on the very
day defendant's suppression motion was denied), the court went on to state: "Even where a
defendant voluntarily and intelligently waives his constitutional rights, we strongly disapprove
of in-custody interrogations if defendant is represented by counsel and counsel has not had
an opportunity to be present at the questioning." Id. at 113. Nevertheless, the court went on
to rule, "However, we cannot say that under the circumstances of this case the trial court
was not justified in receiving the confession." Id. The circumstances to which the court was
referring seemed to be its belief that defendant confessed due to pressure from his mother
and not the police. The court ruled that "[s]ince . . . the record supports a finding that the
confession was given voluntarily and with an understanding of defendant's constitutional rights,
we hold that it was properly received in evidence." Id. In State v. Fossen, 255 N.W.2d 357
(Minn. 1977), the court again expressed disapproval of "the interrogation of an accused in
the absence of already retained counsel." Id. at 362. The court, however, suppressed the
statement due to violations of defendant's Miranda rights and declined to adopt a rule that
"statements of an accused who has retained counsel, made in the absence of counsel, are per
se inadmissible." Id. In State v. Giddings, 290 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980), the court suppressed
defendant's confession because the state failed to prove a knowing and intelligent waiver of
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which had attached when he appeared in court
and had counsel appointed. Although the lack of counsel's presence was a factor in the court's
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Lefthand, government officials in Minnesota likely felt confident that
honoring defendants' rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
of the United States Constitution was the only prerequisite to gaining
an admissible confession." State v. Lefthand expressly changed that
presumption with regard to "in-custody interrogation[s] of a formally
accused person who is represented by counsel," and arguably has set
the stage for an even broader application of the right to counsel
under Minnesota law.
45
In State v. Lefthand,46 the defendant was in custody awaiting
trial on two murder charges.47 He had appeared in court and the
public defender's office had been appointed to represent him. A
specific attorney in the public defender's office was defending Mr.
Lefthand, a fact of which the police were aware. 48 In response to a
request by Mr. Lefthand, the officers investigating his case went to
his cell and took a statement from him. They did so only after
contacting the prosecuting attorney and being "advised they could
go ahead and do it. "49 Mr. Lefthand initiated the encounter and
expressly waived his right to counsel prior to the interrogation. 0
In the Supreme Court, the attorneys for Mr. Lefthand argued
that his statement should be excluded because Mr. Lefthand's right
to counsel had attached and had not been validly waived. In the
defense view, the fact that the police had interrogated the defendant
decision that the waiver was improper, and the court again expressed its disapproval of "both
custodial and noncustodial interrogation of defendants who are represented by counsel," the
court again refused to adopt a per se rule of inadmissibility for statements so obtained. Id.
at 597 & n.3. See also State v. Turc, 353 N.W.2d 502, 511 (Minn. 1984) (expressing disapproval
of "custodial and noncustodial interrogations of accused represented by counsel who is not
present," but refusing to adopt a per se rule barring admissibility of statements where the
suspect is represented in a different matter).
44. This certainly was the view of the prosecutor in the Lefthand case. The government's
brief states: "In their brief, the State Public Defender's Office .. . suggests that there was
some kind of duty on the part of the officers .. . to contact [defendant's] lawyer before
honoring [defendant's] request to come to the jail and talk with him. There is absolutely no
authority ...that requires this kind of conduct on the part of the police or th[e] prosecutor.
Quite to the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has made it absolutely clear in the
decision of Moran v Burbine, . . . that the Sixth Amendment right belongs to the accused,
and not the accused's lawyer." Respondent's Brief at 29, Lefthand (No. C2-91-1937).
45. See infra notes 69-145 and accompanying text.
46. 488 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 1992).
47. Id. at 800.
48. Id.
49. Respondent's Brief at 31-32, Lefthand (No. C2-91-1937).
50. Respondent's Brief at 28-29, Lefthand (No. C2-91-1937).
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"behind his lawyer's back" precluded a finding that the waiver was
"voluntary, knowing, and intelligent."'" The defense also argued that
because the prosecutor condoned the interrogation of the defendant
in the absence of counsel, the prosecutor violated Minnesota Rule
of Professional Conduct 4.2, which prohibits a lawyer from com-
municating with a party the lawyer knows is represented by counsel.
5 2
The defense contended that a violation of Rule 4.2 in a criminal case
justified utilization of the exclusionary rule."
The government responded to the argument that the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights had been violated by relying on the federal
rule that "not only does an accused have a right to counsel, but
they have also a right to waive that right. ' 5 4 In the government's
view, United States Supreme Court precedents controlled the case.
Under the federal rule, a suspect can waive her Sixth Amendment
right to counsel even after the right has attached and been asserted,
provided the suspect initiates the conversation with the government
that leads to the waiver.55 Thus, according to the government, because
Mr. Lefthand initiated the conversation and knowingly and volun-
tarily waived his right to counsel, the statement was admissible.
6
The government also took great issue with the ethical violation
alleged by the defense, asserting that "[tihere is no merit to this
malicious and extremely serious attack . . . . -57 The government
argued that no precedent existed to support the defense allegation.5
The government took the position that under federal case law, the
officers were "authorized by law" to interrogate the defendant and
thus were permitted by the terms of the Rule to talk to the defen-
dant. 9
In a very brief opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed
with virtually every contention made by the government.60 The court
51. Appellant's Brief at 29, Lefthand (No. C2-91-1937).
52. MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 4.2 (1993); Respondent's Brief at 30, Lefthand (No. C2-
91-1937).
53. Appellant's Brief at 30-32, Lefthand (No. C2-91-1937).
54. Respondent's Brief at 25, Lefthand (No. C2-91-1937).
55. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). See discussion at supra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text.
56. Respondent's Brief at 30-31, Lefthand (No. C2-91-1937).
57. Respondent's Brief at 32, Lefthand (No. C2-91-1937).
58. This assertion by the government overstated the case. Although no case had clearly
found a violation of Rule 4.2 in the fact situation presented by the Lefthand case, ample case
law existed for the proposition that the rule applied to prosecutors. See Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d
at 806 n.6.
59. Respondent's Brief at 31-32, Lefthand (No. C2-91-1937).
60. The portion of the opinion dealing with the issue of defendant's interrogation is
only one page in length.
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first noted that "[bjoth the federal and state constitutions guarantee
anyone who is charged with a criminal offense the right to the
assistance of counsel in his defense."'" The court emphasized that
the right had been "jealously guarded" in Minnesota, suggesting the
state protection may be even greater than the federal protection. The
court agreed with the government that the United States Supreme
Court permits defendants to waive the right to counsel, but declared,
"waiver is not the problem here." '62
The court then cited State v. Renfrew63 for the proposition that
the court "long ago" had given notice of its strong disapproval of
in-custody interrogations if the defendant is represented by counsel
and counsel has not had an opportunity to be present at the ques-
tioning. The court cited State v. Giddings6 and State v. Fossen61 for
the proposition that the court had reiterated its disapproval of the
practice "in the strongest of terms." 66 In response to the government's
contention that these cases were "mere dicta," the court stated that
it was "incomprehensible that the attorney-client relationship in the
context of a criminal proceeding would be so cavalierly disre-
garded. ' 67 The court added a footnote at this point to emphasize its
"dismay" at the State's belief that Minnesota Rule of Professional
Conduct 4.2 did not apply to prosecutors in this context .6 The court
then stated its holding in the case before it:
As the highest court of this state, we are independently
responsible for safeguarding the rights of our citizens. Ac-
cordingly, lest there be any doubt, in the exercise of our
supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice
in this and future cases, we decide that in-custody interro-
gation of a formally accused person who is represented by
counsel should not proceed prior to notification of counsel
or the presence of counsel. Statements obtained without
notice to or the presence of counsel are subject to exclusion
at trial. 69
61. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 801 (footnotes omitted).
62. Id.
63. 159 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. 1968).
64. 290 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).-
65. 255 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1977).
66. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 801.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 801 n.6.
69. Id. at 801-02 (footnotes omitted).
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IV. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MINNESOTA AFTER Lefthand
In Lefthand, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified the protec-
tions provided by state law to suspects in the precise position in
which Mr. Lefthand found himself: formally accused individuals
represented by counsel and facing custodial interrogation by law
enforcement officials. In doing so, the court extended to suspects in
Mr. Lefthand's situation protection beyond that available under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the federal constitution. However,
by grounding these new protections in the court's supervisory power,
the court created uncertainty regarding the applicability of this pro-
tection to individuals in situations different from Mr. Lefthand's.
The court expressed concern for Mr. Lefthand's right to counsel
under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution, as well as
concern that a violation of the professional rules of ethics had
occurred. The court's opinion also contains references to concerns
normally addressed through Fifth Amendment protections. Because
the policies underlying each of these rights and the abuses they are
designed to protect against vary, the scope of the protection the
court sought to provide is ambiguous. The concerns expressed by the
court require a rule that transgresses the protections provided by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. In fact, the concerns expressed suggest
the need for protection beyond the narrow confines of the rule the
court expressed in its holding. That the court intended broader
protection than the narrow rule of the case is indicated by the fact
that although the court stated its holding extremely narrowly, it cited
cases for support that extend beyond that narrow holding. Thus, the
opinion raises uncertainty regarding the rights of suspects in future
cases that do not meet all the apparent prerequisites of the new rule.
Despite the court's narrow holding, many of these cases seemingly
should be governed by the new rule because they fall within the
scope of the cases cited by the court in Lefthand and the apparent
policy reasons that motivated the ruling in the case.
The references in Lefthand to formally accused individuals sug-
gests a Sixth Amendment basis for the decision. The federal Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is designed to prevent the government
from circumventing the adversarial system envisioned by that amend-
ment. The right attaches once the process has advanced from inves-
tigatory to prosecutorial. That is, when the government indicates its
decision to prosecute through formal charge, arraignment, indict-
ment, or some other formal judicial proceeding. This right does not
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depend on an actual attorney-client relationship. Once judicial pro-
ceedings have been initiated, the suspect enjoys the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel even if no counsel has been hired or appointed.
Prior to judicial proceedings, even an actual attorney-client relation-
ship is ineffective in triggering the protections of the Amendment.
70
In addition, at least in the federal system, the right is viewed as the
client's right, not the attorney's. It can not be asserted by the
attorney, and even after the client has asserted the right, the client
is free to waive the right unilaterally.
7
1
Thus, if the Sixth Amendment right to counsel formed the basis
of the Lefthand decision, it would signal a rejection by the Minnesota
Court of the United States Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment pre-
cedents which accept waivers of the right to counsel by clients in the
absence of counsel as knowing and voluntary. It is likely that the
court did intend to provide protection beyond the federal Sixth
Amendment right. The court cited both the federal and state provi-
sions guaranteeing the right to counsel and emphasized that the right
to counsel has been "jealously guarded" in Minnesota. 72 The court
also cited instances where the court had expanded the right beyond
the federal right and specifically noted its authority to do so. At
least one commentator has criticized the United States Supreme Court
for accepting waivers in the absence of counsel after the defendant
has been formally charged, 7a and skepticism that waivers in the
absence of counsel were knowing and voluntary has motivated, in
70. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
71. In Brewer v. Williams, the Supreme Court found that a defendant who had been
arraigned and had retained counsel had not waived his right to counsel, but explicitly stated
that it was not promulgating a blanket rule preventing such a waiver without notice to counsel.
430 U.S. 387 (1977). The Court stated, "nor do we [hold] that under the circumstances of
this case [defendant] could not, without notice to counsel, have waived his rights [to counsel]
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 405-06. In Patterson v. Illinois, the
Supreme Court upheld a waiver of the right to counsel following Miranda warnings by a
defendant who had been indicted. 487 U.S. 285 (1988). The majority declined to adopt a rule
requiring the presence of counsel as advocated by the three dissenting justices. Id. The Court
did state that "once an accused has a lawyer, a distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed
at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes effect." Id. at 290 n.3.
However, the Court did not specify these safeguards and commentators have not interpreted
this statement to mean the presence of counsel would be required for a valid waiver. See
WHITaBREAD, supra note 12, at 417; DRESSLER, supra note 15, at 327; LAFAVE, supra note 11,
at 308.
72. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 801.
73. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 12, at 417.
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part, the Minnesota Supreme Court's expressions of disapproval of
such waivers. 74 Such skepticism apparently played a role in the
Lefthand decision itself. The court noted that the waiver and inter-
rogation in question occurred "at the time [Lefthand's] competency
was in question."
' 75
It certainly is possible that the Minnesota Supreme Court was
utilizing the state constitution to expand the protections of the federal
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. However, under federal
law, if the right has attached and has not been waived, it prevents
all attempts to elicit deliberately information from the defendant,
not only those attempts that are coercive, such as custodial interro-
gation. Thus, if the Lefthand court was basing its decision on an
expanded Sixth Amendment right to counsel it would explain the
limitation to formally accused individuals, but would be inconsistent
with the limitation to suspects in custody.
The reference to custody in the Lefthand holding is more sug-
gestive of the policies underlying the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel than the policies underlying the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. The Fifth Amendment right was recognized in Miranda as
necessary to protect the suspect's right against compelled testimony
in inherently coercive situations such as custodial interrogations.
Because this right is grounded in the Fifth Amendment, it is not
dependent on the initiation of the adversarial process with which the
Sixth Amendment is concerned. If the policies underlying the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel were the concern of the Minnesota
Court, however, the limitation to formally accused individuals (a
Sixth Amendment concern) should not be controlling. Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court has indicated its strong belief that the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel is the suspect's, not the attorney's,
and has willingly accepted waivers of the right by clients in absence
of counsel.7 6 Thus, if the Lefthand decision was based on the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel, the court once again would be expand-
ing the federal right. Unlike the Sixth Amendment, however, it is
unlikely that the Lefthand court sought to expand the Fifth Amend-
ment rulings of the United States Supreme Court. Despite the ap-
parent concern over the voluntariness of Mr. Lefthand's waiver and
74. See Giddings v. State, 290 N.W.2d 595, 597-98 (Minn. 1980); State v. Hull, 269
N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 1978).
75. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 801.
76. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (accepting waiver of right to counsel




confession, the court did not cite the Fifth Amendment in its decision.
Moreover, the cases cited by the court suggest that despite the narrow
holding of the case, the Lefthand rule is not limited to suspects in
custody. For example, in Lefthand the court cited Giddings v. State77
as a case in which it had "reiterated [its] disapproval of the practice
[of interrogating suspects in the absence of counsel] 'in the strongest
of terms."' 78 Yet despite the Lefthand court's reference to "in-
custody interrogations" in its ultimate holding, the defendant in
Giddings was not in custody when the interrogation in that case
occurred. 79 In addition, in Giddings and a later case, the Minnesota
Supreme Court expressly stated its disapproval of "both custodial
and noncustodial interrogation of defendants who are represented by
counsel. '"80 Similarly, the cases cited by the Lefthand court also
suggest that the limitation to formally accused individuals in the
holding of Lefthand was not meant to be controlling in future cases.
These cases suggest instead that representation by counsel is the event
that should trigger the protections of the Lefthand holding.
In Lefthand, the court cited State v. Fossen8' for the same
proposition for which it had cited Giddings, that the court had
reiterated its strong disapproval of interrogation of suspects in the
absence of counsel. 82 But again, despite the court's reference to
"formally accused" in its holding in Lefthand,83 the suspect in Fossen
had not been formally accused. Suspicion had focused on the defen-
dant, he had been arrested and booked, and he had spoken to
retained counsel, but apparently he had not been formally accused
through a complaint, indictment, or an appearance before a judge.8
Although the actual basis for the Fossen court's exclusion of the
defendant's statement was a violation of the defendant's Fifth
Amendment right to counsel by failing to give adequate Miranda
warnings, the court stated that its opinion was "buttressed by the
fact that no attempt was made by any law enforcement officer to
77. 290 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
78. 488 N.W.2d at 801.
79. 290 N.W.2d at 596.
80. Giddings, 290 N.W.2d at 597 n.3 (emphasis added); State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d
502, 511 (Minn. 1984). Footnote three in Giddings is the precise footnote cited by the Lefthand
court to support its holding. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 801.
81. 255 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1977).
82. 488 N.W.2d at 801.
83. Id. at 801-02.
84. Fossen, 255 N.W.2d at 359-60.
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insure that defendant's counsel was notified of the interrogation and
afforded the opportunity to be present.
8 5
Another case, State v. Hull,16 although not cited by the court
in- Lefthand, supports the proposition that the rule of Lefthand
extends beyond the narrow holding of the case. In Hull, the defendant
was arrested for murder on the same day the crime had occurred.1
7
From jail the next day, he contacted an attorney who was currently
representing him on a child custody matter. The attorney visited the
defendant at the jail but accomplished little because, according to
the attorney, the defendant was "disheveled and wide-eyed" and
seemed to be "experiencing very severe withdrawal symptoms" during
their conversation. As a result, defendant's statements "made no
sense at all to [the attorney]."" The attorney determined that it
would be more productive to meet with the defendant later "when
he simmered down and made some sense." 89 Before leaving the jail,
the attorney told the defendant he would represent him on the matter
and advised him not to speak to anyone. The attorney also requested
of the sheriff that no one speak to the defendant until the attorney
met with him a second time.9
Later the same day, investigators from the county where the
murder had occurred arrived at the jail, obtained a waiver of defen-
dant's Miranda rights, and questioned the defendant for twenty to
thirty minutes. The interrogation ended when the detectives left to
make arrangements to transport the defendant back to the county
where the murder occurred. At this point, the defendant attempted
to contact his attorney by phone, but was unable to do so. On the
plane ride back to the county where the crime occurred, defendant
initiated conversations about the crime with the investigators and
answered questions.9 On arrival at the jail in the county of the
crime, defendant received a teletype from his attorney advising him
not to talk and promising a visit the next day. 92 Nevertheless, the
85. Id. at 362.
86. 269 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1984).
87. Id. at 907.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Hull, 269 N.W.2d at 907.
91. Each time the defendant made overtures to the investigators concerning the murder,
the investigators reminded him that he had no obligation to speak but did not readvise him
of his complete Miranda warnings. Eventually the investigators began to ask specific questions.
Id. at 908.
92. The attorney's plane had been forced down by bad weather. Id.
[Vol. 17
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
defendant indicated a willingness to continue talking, signed a waiver
statement on the teletype, and answered additional questions. 9a
Defendant later argued that the admission of the statements
taken after he had retained counsel and counsel had specifically
requested the police not to question him "was constitutionally im-
permissible." 94 Although the defendant had not been "formilly ac-
cused," the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that the
defendant's contention was supported by two previous decisions,
Renfrew and Fossen. The court stated that under the circumstances
of the case, "the presence of retained counsel is extremely important
for the intelligent waiver of a constitutional right and for the con-
tinued exercise of the right to legal representation." 95 The court
acknowledged that the investigators "were in diligent pursuit of the
perpetrator of a heinous crime," but stated it "could only express
unqualified approval of their actions had the officers afforded defense
counsel a reasonable opportunity to be present for the waiver of
defendant's rights." The court avoided deciding whether to approve
the officers' actions by holding the admission of defendant's state-
ment to be harmless error. 91
Although the Hull court failed to decide the issue later raised
in Lefthand, the court's discussion indicates that formal accusation
is not crucial to gaining the protection later provided in Lefthand.
The common denominator in Hull and the cases cited in Lefthand
is that the defendant was represented by counsel at the time of the
interrogation. Read together, these cases indicate representation by
counsel, rather than custody or formal accusation, is crucial to the
application of the Lefthand rule. The Lefthand court's reliance on
Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 and its expression of
concern for the attorney-client relationship, rather than the abstract
constitutional right to counsel, further support the conclusion that
the Lefthand rule is activated at the point counsel is retained rather
than at the point of custody or formal accusation.
Although the court in Lefthand referred to the defendant's right
to assistance of counsel under the federal and state constitutions, it
grounded its holding squarely in the court's "supervisory power to
93. Id.
94. Hull, 269 N.W.2d at 908.
95. Id. at 909.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 909-10.
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insure the fair administration of justice." 9 The use of the court's
supervisory power is only necessary if the court based its decision
on something other than the express constitutional or statutory
protections provided to criminal suspects, such as state rules of
professional responsibility. 99 The court emphasized the importance of
Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 to the controversy when
it expressed dismay at the government's assertion that prosecutors
were beyond the reach of Rule 4.2.'00 The court further noted "the
majority of jurisdictions presented with the issue have held that
communicating with defendants who are represented by counsel vi-
olates the applicable rules of professional conduct."'' The court's
emphasis on Rule 4.2 supports activating the protections of its holding
on the retention of counsel. A violation of Rule 4.2 requires com-
munication with "a party the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter.' 102 The mere attachment of a consti-
tutional right to counsel in the abstract would not trigger the rule. 03
The centrality of representation by counsel is further evidenced by
the court's justification of the rule's impact on law enforcement with
the statement, "We are mindful this requirement may cause some
delay in the interrogation process; but the importance of the attorney-
client relationship makes it necessary.' °4
98. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 801.
99. The source of the supervisory power utilized by the court is not clear from the
decision. There is no expressstatutory or constitutional provision providing the court with
such power. In previous cases in the criminal justice area, the court has referred to its inherent
supervisory power. See State v. Hepfel, 279 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Minn. 1979) (expressly stating
that the court is not acting on a constitutional basis but on the basis of its inherent supervisory
power); McDonnell v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 460 N.W.2d 363, 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(discussing Supreme Court use of supervisory power rather than "a broader state constitutional
analysis" to expand right to counsel); Ramsey Co. Pub. Defender v. Fleming, 294 N.W.2d
275, 278 (Minn. 1980) (referring to "our inherent supervisory power"); State ex rel. Doe v.
St. Mary's Hosp., 295 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 1980) (same). For cases discussing the scope of
such power and reasons for using the power, see In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785, 806 n.6
(1978); State v. McKee, Lexis 631 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574,
596 (Minn. 1982); State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Minn. 1980).
100. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 801 n.6.
101. Id.
102. MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 4.2 (1993) provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer
shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows
to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."
103. See discussion of "attachment" of Rule 4.2 in Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell,
State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact And
Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 333-41 (1992).
104. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 802 (emphasis added).
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Avoiding a constitutional basis for the new rule makes sense if
the goal is to protect the attorney-client relationship rather than the
"right to counsel" in the abstract. The right to counsel under Article
I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution and under the Sixth
Amendment to the federal constitution attaches independent of the
actual attorney-client relationship and in some cases attaches at a
very early stage in the criminal investigation process. 105 Grounding
the Lefthand right outside the Constitution allows the court to avoid
unnecessarily delaying interrogation with a requirement that counsel
be present when police obtain a waiver in situations where there is
no actual attorney-client relationship and where the court likely
believes concerns about police behavior are adequately addressed
through Fifth Amendment protections under Miranda.106
Focusing on the attorney-client relationship also allows the court
to protect that relationship in situations where it is otherwise unpro-
tected because the right to counsel under Article I, section 6 and the
Sixth Amendment has not attached. For instance, if it is the rela-
tionship rather than the abstract right the court seeks to protect,
application of the rule should not be thwarted in cases where a
suspect has retained counsel but has not been formally charged.'0°
But a rule based on the constitutional right to counsel would not
apply in such a situation. The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision
in Fossen and its citation to that case in Lefthand suggest the court
intended to protect the attorney-client relationship even where the
constitutional right to counsel had not attached. 0 The court likely
also intended to provide protection to an actual attorney-client re-
lationship beyond that which is provided under the Fifth Amendment.
The protections of the Fifth Amendment are designed to assist the
defendant in making the initial decision to seek the assistance of
105. See Freidman v. Comm'r, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991) (extending the right to
counsel under the state constitution to drivers from whom the police seek blood alcohol
testing).
106. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 953-54 (arguing that the Fifth Amendment provides
sufficient protection to criminal defendants, thus making application of the ethical rules largely
unnecessary).
107. But see Schwartz, supra note 11, at 948-53 (arguing that ethical rule should not
apply to prosecutors at all, but especially not prior to indictment).
108. See also State v. Hull, 269 N.W.2d 905 (1978) (expressing disapproval of interro-
gation of suspect in the absence of counsel despite fact that suspect had not been formally
charged); see also United States v. Jamail, 546 F. Supp 646, 654 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the assertion that ethical rule applies
only after commencement of criminal proceedings).
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counsel, not to protect against government circumvention of an actual
attorney-client relationship. °9 Thus, if, as it stated, the Minnesota
Supreme Court's concern in Lefthand was the attorney-client rela-
tionship, the application of the Lefthand rule should not turn on
whether a custodial interrogation, the triggering event for Fifth
Amendment protections, takes place. Again, the Minnesota Court's
decision in Giddings and its citation to that case in Lefthand support
this reading.
Understanding that Rule 4.2 provides the basis for the Lefthand
rule also explains what some may perceive to be the overly protective
and paternalistic nature of the Lefthand case in its refusal to give
effect to a voluntary decision of a suspect to proceed without
counsel. 10 Unlike the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel,
which are the client's and therefore can be asserted only by the client
and can be freely waived by the client, the protections of Rule 4.2
are for the benefit of both the client and the lawyer. Unlike consti-
tutional rights, rights under the ethical rules cannot be waived without
the consent of the lawyer."' Similarly, grounding the decision in the
ethical rules provides the court with flexibility in terms of a remedy
for the violation. Although precedent requires exclusion of evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution, there is no such requirement
for violations of ethical rules." 2 The Lefthand court stated only that
statements so taken were "subject to exclusion," it did not require
exclusion." 3 Indications are that the court considered the Lefthand
case a particularly egregious one that demanded the exclusionary rule
as a remedy." 4 It is possible that less egregious violations may not
109. See Illinois v. Patterson, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (noting that police efforts to prevent
attorney access to client do not violate Fifth Amendment, although it would constitute a
violation if the Sixth Amendment had attached); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)
(defendant's Fifth Amendment rights not violated by police officers' denial of attorney's
request for access to client during interrogation).
110. Chief Justice Burger expressed these criticisms in his dissent in Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 417 (1977); see also Cramton and Udell, supra note 103, at 348.
Ill. Cramton & Udell, supra note 103, at 325, 341-44.
112. See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 842 (2d Cir. 1988); Schwartz, supra
note 11, at 954-57.
113. 488 N.W.2d at 802.
114. The court stated, "Of grave concern to us here is what we can only perceive as an
emerging pattern of conduct, calculated to subvert the intent of our criminal rules .... In
this case, the prosecution allowed the in-custody interrogation of appellant without notice to
or the presence of appellant's court-appointed counsel and with full knowledge that a com-
petency examination had been ordered .... ." Id.
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require so severe a remedy.II5 Thus, the use of the ethical rule provides
the court the flexibility to address the concerns courts and commen-
tators have identified as not adequately addressed by constitutional
protections-overreaching by prosecutors in cases where the consti-
tutional right to counsel has not attached, skepticism concerning the
validity of waivers, and the limited scope of the constitutional pro-
tections-without unnecessarily constraining law enforcement officials
with bright line constitutional rules that demand exclusion of evidence
as a remedy for violations.
116
Viewing Rule 4.2 as the basis for the Lefthand decision does
not completely clarify the court's holding and, in fact, presents
significant additional issues that have been discussed by courts and
commentators considering the applicability of Rule 4.2 to criminal
investigations. The first issue raised is whether the Rule, arguably
drafted with civil litigation in mind," 7 even applies to prosecutors in
a criminal case. Several commentators have argued the rule should
not apply, but most concede that courts have virtually uniformly
held that prosecutors are subject to the rule." 8 The Lefthand court
agreed, expressing its "dismay[] [at] state's counsel's belief that
prosecutors are beyond the reach of our professional conduct rules,
specifically Rule 4.2 ... .
Even if the rule applies to prosecutors, however, commentators
raise several arguments to exempt contact by law enforcement offi-
cials with represented suspects during the investigatory stage of
criminal prosecutions. One argument is that contact with represented
115. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 944 (discussing state cases adopting such an
approach).
116. The Lefthand court was correct that most courts have found Rule 4.2 to apply to
prosecutors. However, few have applied the exclusionary rule or even recognized it as the
appropriate remedy of violations. See United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1988),
rev'g 678 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Cramton and Udell, supra note 103, at 327-28
(exclusion generally not used as a remedy for violation of ethics rule where government conduct
complies with Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
117. See Bruce A. Green, A Prosecutor's Communications With Defendants: What Are
the Limits?, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 283, 285 (1988); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 942, 947-48.
118. See Green, supra note 117, at 285; H. Richard Uviller, Evidence From the Mind
of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1176-83 (1987); Cramton & Udell, supra note 103, at 326-28; Schwartz,
supra note 11, at 941-54. For a discussion of the controversy raised by then Attorney General
Thornburgh when he circulated a memorandum to all United States Attorneys taking the
position that federal prosecutors were not subject to the rule, see Cramton & Udell, supra
note 103, at 318-24.
119. 488 N.W.2d at 801 n.6.
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suspects during a criminal investigation that is not otherwise prohib-
ited by constitutional protections is permitted under the terms of the
rule which exempt contact "authorized by law." This argument has
met with little success. Even courts that eventually uphold contact
with suspects by prosecutors rarely rely on this express exemption in
the rule, preferring instead to find the rule inapplicable on a different
basis or simply not to specify the basis for their decision.
20
Another argument is that prior to indictment or other formal
proceeding, the suspect is not a "party" as provided in the rule. At
least one court has accepted this argument by analogizing to the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 2 1 Such reliance on the express
words of the rule is unusual. Although several other courts similarly
have found the rule inapplicable to the investigatory stage of criminal
prosecutions, particularly undercover operations, none of the courts
have based their decisions on an express holding that prior to the
commencement of criminal proceedings, suspects are not "parties"
for purposes of the rule. 122 In fact, such a holding would seem
contrary to the official comment to Rule 4.2 which states, "This rule
also covers any person, whether or not a party to a formal proceed-
ing, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter in ques-
tion.'
123
As discussed above, despite the reference to "formally accused"
individuals in the Lefthand court's holding, a strong case can be
made that the Lefthand rule is not limited to such individuals. The
Lefthand court would not be alone in providing such broader pro-
tection. 124 Some courts have applied the rule to targets of grand jury
investigations prior to indictment, and in United States v. Hammad ,I2S
the court held the rule applicable to a non-target apparently because
the prosecutors were aware that he was represented by counsel with
respect to the matter being investigated. Rather than relying on strict
interpretations of the language of the rule, courts seem to make their
decisions by balancing the need to protect the suspect from over-
reaching by the government and the need to prevent the government
from circumventing the adversarial process against the need to avoid
120. See Cramton & Udell, supra note 103, at 346-49; Green, supra note 117, at 290-
93.
121. See United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. 1430 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
122. Green, supra note 117, at 293-95.
123. MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 4.2 (1993).
124. Green, supra note 117, at 295-96 (discussing cases finding such broader protection).
125. 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'g 678 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
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unduly hampering legitimate law enforcement activities. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court's expression of concern for the attorney-client
relationship makes it unlikely that application of the rule will be
prevented by an artificial line such as indictment or commencement
of formal proceedings. The court is more likely to focus on the
extent to which the attorney-client relationship has been established
and is being circumvented, regardless of the stage of the proceeding.
Another issue raised by commentators and largely unanswered
by the Lefthand decision is the extent to which Rule 4.2 applies to
communication with represented suspects by non-attorneys. Although
the Rules of Professional Conduct apply only to attorneys, Rule
8.4(a) prohibits lawyers from violating the rules "through the acts
of another."'' 2 6 Just as an attorney in a civil matter may not contact
a represented party through an investigator, prosecutors cannot ex-
empt themselves from Rule 4.2 by directing police officers to conduct
an interrogation. The question remains at what point is the conduct
of the police officers imputed to the prosecutor. Most courts limit
the application of the rule to instances where the police are acting
as the "alter ego" of the prosecutor. 27 Unfortunately, courts gen-
erally do not explain what they mean by alter ego. In Lefthand, the
only involvement of the prosecutor was being informed of the inten-
tion of the officers to interrogate the defendant and telling the
officers to "go ahead and do it."12s Absent this contact with the
prosecutor, it is unclear whether Rule 4.2 would apply. Despite the
likelihood that police will not contact prosecutors prior to interro-
gating suspects, the Lefthand court's holding contained no indication
that involvement by a prosecutor was a prerequisite to the operation
of the rule. The holding flatly prohibits "in custody interrogation of
a formally accused individual" without reference to involvement by
the prosecutor. Of course, if the application of the rule is limited to
"formally accused" individuals, the prosecutor's office will by def-
inition have some involvement because it will have filed the formal
accusation or complaint. If, -as argued above, the rule of Lefthand
should not be limited to formally accused individuals, the applicability
of Rule 4.2 to interrogations prior to formal charges and without
some participation by the prosecutor is more uncertain. 29 That
126. MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 8.4(a) (1993).
127. Cramton & Udell, supra note 103, at 344; Green, supra note 117, at 303-05.
128. Respondent's Brief at 30-31, Lefthand (No. C2-91-1937).
129. The rule could apply in these situations based on the theory that prosecutors have
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involvement of the prosecutor may have been crucial in Lefthand is
suggested by the court's reference to the prosecution three times in
its final paragraph:
In this case, the prosecution allowed the in-custody inter-
rogation of appellant without notice to or the presence of
appellant's court-appointed counsel and with full knowledge
that a competency examination had been ordered . . . . 'We
have on occasion warned the prosecution in our opinions
that it has used improper tactics. However, these warnings
appear to have been to no avail.' Justice is a process, not
simply a result. Where the prosecution persists in skirting
our rules and disregarding our admonitions, we are left with
no option but to reverse. 3 0
If in fact the basis for the Lefthand court's decision was Rule
4.2, many questions remain. The case clearly extends suspects' pro-
tections beyond those available under the federal constitution, some-
thing many courts applying Rule 4.2 have been unwilling to do, but
the precise scope of the protection is unclear. Especially regarding
interrogations prior to formal charges and without the knowledge or
participation of the prosecutor's office, it is not clear Rule 4.2 would
apply. Although Rule 4.2 is directed at attorneys, and the court's
opinion directs its ire at the "prosecution," it is hard to imagine
that what the police did would have been permissible had they simply
not contacted the prosecutors office. Such a limited ruling would
permit prosecutors to avoid the Lefthand rule simply by making
known to police that they should act first, ask permission later.
It is possible, of course, that the Lefthand rule will not be
defined by the parameters of Rule 4.2. The Minnesota Supreme
Court could have been exercising its supervisory power in a more
general way. The court stated that it was exercising its supervisory
power "to insure the fair administration of justice," not to insure
compliance with rules of professional conduct. Given the court's
irritation that its previous "admonitions" were disregarded, a pros-
ecutor should be wary of making technical arguments based on the
an affirmative duty to supervise the police with whom they work. This would be analogous
to a private attorney who could not claim ignorance if an investigator in his office consistently
(or even once) contacted represented parties. Nevertheless, this argument has been described
as "extreme" and "has generally been rejected." See Green, supra note 117, at 300-01.
130. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d at 802 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
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language of Rule 4.2 to avoid the Lefthand rule, especially in light
of the fact that the court's holding does not rely expressly on Rule
4.2 and makes no mention of a requirement of the police acting as
the alter ego of the prosecution.
The above discussion suggests that the rule of the Lefthand case
was intended to protect the attorney-client relationship as opposed
to the more abstract right to counsel defendants enjoy under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal constitution and Article
I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution. Although this seemingly
supports conditioning application of the rule on the defendant ac-
tually retaining counsel and establishing the attorney-client relation-
ship, such a limitation cuts too narrowly to protect the underlying
concerns that motivated the decision.
The court in Lefthand expressed extreme concern for the sanctity
of the attorney-client relationship and severe distress at what it
perceived to be recent and consistent attempts by the government to
circumvent that relationship. 3' But the retention of an attorney can
be accomplished through the simple act of a phone call. Thus, under
the Lefthand rule, an accused who is able to reach an attorney by
telephone is insulated from further interrogation in the absence of
her attorney. Likewise, an accused who asserts her right to consult
with counsel, but is unable to reach an attorney on her initial attempt,
should also be afforded protection from interrogation unless her
attorney is present or notified. There is little or no reason to
distinguish between a successful and an unsuccessful attempt to
contact and retain an attorney following an express assertion of a
defendant's right to consult with an attorney. In State v. Hull,12 the
Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "When a suspect is sufficiently
concerned to exercise his constitutional right and obtain legal repre-
sentation, the effectiveness of that right is undermined by police
practices, however benign, intended to extract incriminating evidence
in the absence of counsel."' 3
The same is true, of course, when a suspect is "sufficiently
concerned to exercise his constitutional right" and attempts to obtain
legal counsel. The police should not be permitted, following an
unsuccessful attempt by a suspect to obtain counsel, to undermine
defendant's right to counsel by utilizing "benign practices" that
131. See 488 N.W.2d at 801-02.
132. 269 N.W.2d 905 (1978).
133. Id. at 909.
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would clearly be unlawful if only the phone call had been successful.
The suggested rule is supported somewhat by the facts of Giddings.
In Giddings, although the defendant's right to counsel had attached
under the Sixth Amendment and under state law because he had
appeared in court and the public defender's office had been appointed
to represent him, no particular attorney was appointed and, at the
time of questioning, the defendant had never spoken with an attor-
ney. 3 4 Thus, the defendant was represented by counsel in only the
barest of senses.' 35 Nevertheless, Mr. Giddings would be entitled to
the protection of the Lefthand holding if his case arose today. If
suspects in the position of Mr. Giddings are entitled to the protection
of the Lefthand rule, suspects who affirmatively attempt to establish
an attorney-client relationship by contacting an attorney should also
enjoy the protection of the rule.
Conditioning the Lefthand rule on the assertion of the right to
counsel rather than actual representation is also supported by the
rationale utilized by the court in State v. Ture.3 6 In Ture, the
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a rule that prevented police from
obtaining waivers in the absence of counsel from suspects represented
by counsel on unrelated charges. "I The court rejected the rule because
whether a suspect enjoyed the protection provided would "turn[] on
the fortuity that a suspect has been charged on an unrelated offense
before interrogation takes place." ' Similarly, if the rule announced
in Lefthand is limited to suspects who actually retain counsel, the
protection of the rule will "turn on the fortuity" of whether the
suspect successfully completes his or her phone call or whether the
attorney is immediately available. 39
134. 290 N.W.2d at 596.
135. See infra note 141.
136. 353 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1984).
137. Defense counsel was urging the court to adopt what was then the rule in New
York. See People v. Bartolomeo, 423 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1981). That rule has since also been
rejected in New York. People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1990).
138. Ture, 353 N.W.2d at 511.
139. The United States Supreme Court has also expressed a disinclination to have the
right to counsel turn on the "fortuity" of actual representation. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 430 (1986). In that case the Court refused to extend protection of the Sixth Amendment
to defendant whose family had retained counsel. However, crucial to the decision was the fact
that defendant himself had never asserted his right by requesting counsel. See also WHITEBREAD,
supra note 12, at 417 (discussing the need to avoid inequality of treatment of suspects based
on the fortuity of the suspects having actually retained counsel or having had one appointed
at formal charging); William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L.
REv. 761, 835-37 (1989) (criticizing several arbitrary distinctions in Supreme Court decisions
relating to waiver of right to counsel).
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A rule that turns on such a fortuity makes little sense. Because
the right that the Lefthand rule was designed to protect is the
defendant's right to consult with counsel, the defendant should enjoy
the benefit of the rule at the point she asserts that right, not at the
point that a particular attorney agrees to provide the requested legal
advice.140 A contrary rule would place defendants at the mercy of
the police practices the Minnesota Supreme Court has criticized in
Lefthand and other cases if, for whatever reason, they were not
immediately able to reach their attorney. This seems particularly
contrary to the spirit of the Lefthand rule in cases in which the
suspect is attempting to contact an attorney that is virtually certain
to agree to represent the suspect because the attorney already rep-
resents the suspect on another matter, has represented the suspect in
the past, or is a friend of the suspect or her family. Triggering the
rule on actual representation rather than the assertion of the right
also creates a situation in which police have an incentive not to assist
a defendant who has difficulty remembering the name or phone
number of an attorney, contrary to the obligation recognized by the
court in Giddings v. State.'4' It would also lead to endless litigation
140. Similarly, if the rule is designed to protect the lawyer in her efforts to provide
effective representation, as some commentators have suggested, the lawyer should be given the
chance to provide such representation when someone seeks her out for assistance. The lawyer
should not be denied that opportunity because she was unavailable at precisely the time the
potential client called.
141. 290 N.W.2d at 597-98. In Giddings, the court suppressed a statement made by the
defendant after determining that the waiver obtained by the police was invalid. Id. In doing
so, the court acknowledged that the police were aware that the defendant was represented by
counsel and that the defendant did not know the name of the public defender who had been
assigned to represent him. The court stated that the police "knew the name of the public
defender in Duluth and how to reach his office. They could have advised Giddings how to
contact him so as to ascertain the name of his appointed counsel, or they could have contacted
the public defender's office themselves. They chose to do neither and now seek to rely on the
written waiver of counsel executed by Giddings." Id. at 597. Similarly, at the point of initially
obtaining counsel, police may simply give a suspect a phone but not help the suspect in any
manner to contact his attorney. They may be aware that the suspect is represented by counsel
on another matter, but do nothing to help the suspect locate that attorney. At the very least,
the police should provide the suspect with a phone book to help him remember the name of
his attorney or to contact a different attorney. Rather than cause endless litigation into
questions such as these, the police should be required to honor the defendant's right to silence
at least until counsel is contacted and available to be present for the interrogation. If the
delay becomes too long, and the police need to interrogate the defendant, they can contact
the public defender's office for substitute counsel. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
237 & n.27 (1967) (suggesting such a possibility when counsel is required for a pretrial lineup
but is unavailable).
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on the question of whether the attorney had in fact been retained. 42
What if the attorney requires a retainer prior to representation? What
if a relative or friend of the defendant has retained an attorney at
defendant's request? What if the defendant used the phone to contact
a family member with instructions to retain an attorney? In this and
many other situatiorts the officers may not know when the attorney
is actually retained. Even in the typical case where the defendant
attempts to contact an attorney, since the officers should not be
listening to defendant's phone call to an attorney, they likely will
not know if the attorney has been retained. In order to "insure the
fair administration of justice" in Minnesota, it is the invocation of
the right to consult with an attorney rather than actual retention of
an attorney that should trigger the protection of the Lefthand rule.
It is easy to imagine a case that would call for application of
the Lefthand rule despite the failure of a defendant actually to have
retained counsel. Consider the not atypical situation where police
take an individual into custody on a probation violation or outstand-
ing warrant in order to question the individual about an unrelated
crime. Because the Sixth Amendment is crime specific, 43 the suspect's
right to counsel under that Amendment will not be applicable to the
crime for which police wish to question the suspect, even if the
suspect has retained counsel on the matter for which he is in custody
(the probation matter). If the suspect is represented on the matter
for which she is in custody, she may assert her Fifth Amendment
right to counsel and seek to contact that attorney for representation
on the unrelated crime about which the police wish to question her.
For any number of reasons, this attempt may be unsuccessful. If,
after attempting unsuccessfully to contact her attorney, the suspect
initiates conversation with the police, she may be subjected to police
interrogation without the presence of counsel or notice to counsel.
She need only provide a waiver. But had she successfully completed
her phone call to her attorney, such interrogation would have been
prohibited because the uncounseled waiver would have been ineffec-
tive. '44
A suspect in such a situation should be afforded the same
protection regardless of her success in actually making contact with
142. See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 836-37 (2d Cir. 1988) (government
asserted DR 7-104(A)(1) was not violated because Assistant United States Attorney did not
know defendant was represented by counsel at the time he sent informant to question
defendant).
143. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
144. See Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d 799; Fossen, 255 N.W.2d 357; Hull, 269 N.W.2d 905;
State v. Renfrew, 159 N.W.2d Ill (Minn. 1968).
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the attorney. Once the right to counsel has been invoked, the police
must not be permitted to interrogate an accused until counsel has
been notified and has a reasonable opportunity to be present.
Suspects cannot be stripped of the valuable protection that clearly
would have been afforded to them had they been successful in
reaching their attorney merely because they were unable to make
contact. This important and necessary protection should not be
determined by the fortuity of successfully contacting an attorney.
Once an accused invokes his or her right to an attorney, no inter-
rogation should take place until an attorney is notified and has a
reasonable opportunity to be present. Such a rule will provide con-
sistent protection to suspects and will not unduly hamper law en-
forcement. The rule would not apply to suspects who waive their
right when initially asked. It only applies if the suspect asserts the
right. Current Fifth Amendment 'law already requires that the inter-
rogation cease in such a case. However, Fifth Amendment law permits
the police to seek a waiver if the suspect initiates communication
with them. In practice, it is hard for the suspect to avoid initiation,
with the result that the police can quickly return to the task of
obtaining a waiver. The rule proposed by this Article prevents such
conduct and demands that the assertion of the right to counsel be
taken seriously.1 41 This is consistent with the approach of the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, which has expressed skepticism about the
validity of such waivers absent the presence of counsel.
V. CONCLUSION
In State v. Lefthand, the Minnesota Supreme Court signaled its
intention to provide protection for attorney-client relationships in
criminal cases beyond that currently provided by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the federal constitution. The precise basis for the
court's holding is unclear, but includes, at least in part, Minnesota
Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2. A more complete explanation
of the court's rationale would have been useful in determining the
scope of the new rule the court articulated, particularly because there
are indications that the court intended the protections of the rule to
extend beyond the narrow holding of the case.
145. Commentators have expressed concern that current Fifth and Sixth Amendment law
provides inadequate protection, particularly because of the ease of obtaining a waiver. Stuntz,
supra note 139, at 762-69, 801-42; Cramton & Udell, supra note 103, at 328-33.
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This Article has argued that the precedents cited by the court
indicate that the rule may not be limited to individuals formally
accused of a crime or to individuals in custody based on suspicion
of involvement in a crime. The Article also strongly argues that the
limitation in the rule to individuals represented by counsel must be
read to include individuals who have requested representation by
counsel. Absent such a reading, suspects in identical situations will
be provided vastly different protections depending on whether their
initial attempt to retain a lawyer is successful. To have the protections
of the rule turn on such a "fortuity" is contrary to Minnesota
Supreme Court precedent and to the court's dedication to "jealously
guarding" the right to counsel in Minnesota.
Numerous questions remain concerning the scope to the Lefthand
holding and the extent to which the court will use the exclusionary
rule to enforce violations of the' ruling. Whatever the eventual
resolution of those questions, law enforcement officials should tread
lightly when dealing with a suspect who either has retained counsel
or has indicated a desire to do so, whether or not the individual is
formally accused or in custody. At least for now, blind reliance on
even a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel by the client in
such situations could result in the loss of valuable evidence.
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